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CAMPAIGN FINANCE, THE PARTIES AND

THE COURT: A COMMENT ON
COLORADO REPUBLICAN FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE v. FEDERAL

ELECTIONS COMMISSION
Richard Briffault*
Last term, in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission,1 the Supreme Court considered a direct attack on the constitutionality of the Federal
Election Campaign Act's ("FECA") limits on political party expenditures. Colorado Republican was the Court's first campaign
finance case in six years and the first in which the four Justices
appointed by Presidents Bush and Clinton had an opportunity to
participate. Colorado Republican was also the first case in the
twenty-year regime of Buckley v. Valeo2 concerned with the constitutionality of restrictions on parties.3 Coming at a time of rising public concern, increased legislative activity, and continued
academic ferment over campaign finance, Colorado Republican
offered the promise of clarifying the current Court's approach to
campaign finance regulation, marking out the contours of the
* Professor of Law and Director of Legislative Drafting Research Fund, Columbia
University. This Comment is based on a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, September 1, 1996.
1. 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
2. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
3. Buckley addressed only one issue concerning parties-the claim that FECA discriminated, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, against independent candidates and parties without national committees because the Act authorized
additional spending for political party national committees. The Court determined that, as
a portion of the Buckley decision invalidated the limits on aggregate campaign expenditures and independent expenditures, it had eliminated the basis for the discrimination
claim. 424 U.S. at 58-59 and nn.66, 67. The Court did not consider any First Amendment
challenge to limits on party spending.
In FederalElections Commission v. DemocraticSenatorial CampaignCommittee, 454
U.S. 27, 28-29 (1981), the Court considered the statutory question of whether FECA
barred an "agency agreement," that is, a state party's designation of a national party
committee as the state party's agent for making expenditures allowed by the Act. In
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982), the Court
considered the constitutionality of the application of disclosure requirements to a minor
party that had been subject to government harassment.
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rights of parties in the campaign finance context, and assessing
the implications of judicial doctrine for potential legislative
changes.
The Court, however, failed to resolve the central issue in the
case. Instead, it fragmented into four opinions, none of which
commanded the votes of more than three Justices.4 A sevenmember majority rejected the effort of the Federal Elections
Commission ("FEC") to enforce FECA in the case before it, but
the three Justices who joined the pivotal opinion authored by
Justice Breyer limited their views-and, thus, the holding of the
Court-to the facts of the case and declined to reach the broader
issue of the constitutionality of limits on party involvement in
campaign finance. The six Justices who did reach the issue were
sharply divided. Moreover, one Justice directly, and two others
implicitly, challenged Buckley v. Valeo's basic approach to campaign finance regulation-although their different opinions embraced decidedly different perspectives.
Colorado Republican illustrates nicely the conceptual difficulties built into the Court's campaign finance doctrine. Buckley's central concerns have proven difficult to apply in practice or
justify in theory, and the Court has vacillated with respect to the
degree of deference to be given to the judgment of the political
branches concerning whether campaign practices present dangers
that may be the basis for regulation.
Moreover, political party spending is particularly difficult to
fit into the Court's conceptual framework because party activities
bridge Buckley's basic doctrinal categories. Many academics
have urged a more party-centered approach to campaign finance-the Committee for Party Renewal filed an amicus brief
in the case-claiming it would reduce the influence of special interests on the political process. However, so long as parties themselves receive their funds from private individuals and
organizations, it is questionable whether a party-centered system
would do much to ameliorate special interest influence. Moreover, judicial establishment of an unlimited party spending right
could have broader effects on the campaign finance laws.
Part I of this comment briefly summarizes the facts, statutory framework, and procedural history of Colorado Republican.
Part II reviews the Buckley doctrine. Parts III and IV examine
and appraise the Court's multiple opinions. Finally, Parts V and
VI consider the implications of constitutional protection of party
4. In a sense there were five opinions, since Justice Thomas's opinion was joined in
part, but only in part, by two other Justices.
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spending for the campaign finance laws, and the implications of
Colorado Republican for the future of campaign finance
doctrine.
I. BACKGROUND: THE FACTS, THE STATUTE, AND
THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Colorado Republican was ten years in the making. In January 1986, then-Representative Tim Wirth declared his candidacy
for the Democratic nomination for the Senate seat being vacated
by Gary Hart that fall.5 Shortly thereafter, Wirth began to run
ads outlining his position on a number of issues. In April and
May 1986, the Colorado Republican Party paid for three radio
ads and two pamphlets criticizing Wirth's voting record, mentioning that he was running for the Senate, and charging Wirth with
misrepresenting his record in his ads. The anti-Wirth radio ad
which became the subject of the FEC's enforcement action
against the Colorado Republican Party included the following
statements:
"I just saw some ads where Tim Wirth said he's for a
strong defense and a balanced budget. But according to his
record, Tim Wirth voted against every major new weapon system in the last five years. And he voted against the balanced
budget amendment."
"Tim Wirth has a right to run for the Senate, but he
doesn't have a right to change the facts." 6
The state party committee paid $15,000 to run the ad. At the time
it was aired, three Republicans were seeking their party's nomination, although two withdrew before the Republican state convention in June. Wirth and his Republican opponent, Rep. Ken
Kramer, were not officially nominated until their party primaries
in August.
In June 1986, the Colorado Democratic Party filed a complaint with the FEC alleging that the Republican anti-Wirth expenditures violated the spending limits FECA imposes on party
committees.7 In January 1989, the FEC determined there was
5. Wirth won the election, served out his six-year term, and declined to seek another term, all before the district court in this case reached a decision. The case then took
three more years to wend its way to the Supreme Court.
6. FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Camp. Comm., 59 F.3d 1015, 1018 n.1 (10th
Cir. 1995).
7. The Democrats also alleged that the Republicans violated FECA's reporting requirements in listing the costs of the anti-Wirth program as operating expenses and not as
expenditures with respect to an election for federal office.
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probable cause to believe the Republicans had violated FECA
and, when settlement negotiations failed, instituted a civil enforcement action. The Republicans responded by arguing that
the expenditures in question were not subject to the FECA limits, and that the FECA limits are unconstitutional.
FECA provides two avenues for parties to spend money on
behalf of candidates for federal office. First, parties, like all other
political committees, may contribute up to $5000 to a candidate
"with respect to any election for Federal office."8 Second, parties
may make "coordinated expenditures" on behalf of their candidates. FECA ordinarily treats expenditures made "in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with" a candidate as contributions
subject to contribution limits even if the "donor" did not actually
give the money to a candidate.9 FECA, however, provides a special exception for party committee spending "in connection with
the general election campaign of candidates"1o for Congress. In
a Senate election, a party committee may spend up to two cents
times the voting age population of the state in which the race
occurs, or $20,000 adjusted for inflation from a 1974 base, in coordination with the party's Senate candidate's campaign.11
On the other hand, the FEC has determined that parties
may not make "independent expenditures," that is, expenditures
not in "cooperation, consultation, or concert" with a candidate.
FECA, as amended in 1974, had imposed dollar ceilings on independent expenditures by individuals and political committees,
but the Supreme Court in Buckley held such limits unconstitutional. The FEC subsequently deemed parties incapable of making expenditures truly independent of their own candidates'
campaigns,12 and adopted a regulation forbidding national and
state party committees from making "independent expenditures
in connection with the general election campaign[s]" for federal
office.13
At the time of the 1986 election, the limit on coordinated
party spending for the Senate race in Colorado was $103,000,
8. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (1994).
9. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (1994).
10. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(1) (1994).
11. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3)(A) (1994). This limit also applies to House of Representatives races in any state entitled to only one Representative. For other elections to the
House, the ceiling is $10,000 adjusted for inflation from a 1974 base. 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(d)(3)(B) (1994).
12. See FEC Adv. Op'n 1985-14, 2 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 5819 at
11,185 n.4 (5/30/85); FEC Adv. Op'n 1984-15, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH)
5766 at 11,070 n. 2 (5/31/84).
13. 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(b)(4) (1996).
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which would have been more than enough to cover the antiWirth ad. However, the Colorado state party, like most state Republican parties, had assigned to the National Republican Senatorial Committee ("NRSC") its coordinated spending authority.
As a result, the anti-Wirth ad violated FECA-if the spending
limit applied, and was constitutional.
In the lower courts, much of the ColoradoRepublican litigation focused on the question of the applicability of the FECA
limits to the anti-Wirth ad. FECA's coordinated spending ceiling
and reporting requirements apply only to expenditures "in connection with" a federal election. But the notion of spending "in
connection with" an election campaign is inherently fuzzy and
potentially sweeping. Communications concerning the performance of public officials or the wisdom of pending legislation can
certainly affect the electoral fortunes of candidates, so campaign
finance regulations could logically apply to a wide range of communications concerning politics and government. Such a broad
reading could chill free and unfettered discussion of public issues.
The Supreme Court thus determined that the First Amendment
requires statutes regulating spending "in connection with" elections to be read narrowly and limited to spending expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.'4
Although the Colorado Republicans' ad clearly identified
Tim Wirth, it did not literally urge Wirth's defeat or the election
of a Republican. The district court concluded that the ad "[a]t
best.., contains an indirect plea for action" which fell short of
the "express advocacy" required to avoid infringing on constitutionally protected discussion of public issues.15 The FECA limit
thus did not apply to the anti-Wirth ad, and the court dismissed
the FEC's suit.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The appellate
court agreed with the district court that the anti-Wirth ad was not
express advocacy "within the narrow definition" of prior
Supreme Court cases.' 6 But, after extended analysis,'7 the court
deferred to the FEC's determination that limits on coordinated
14. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1976); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life ("MCFL"), 479 U.S. 238, 248-50. The discussion in Buckley concerned a
provision of FECA that Buckley ultimately invalidated. MCFL considered the restriction
on expenditures by corporations and unions. Neither case directly addressed the meaning
of the "in connection with" language in the context of party coordinated spending.
15. FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Camp. Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448, 1455-56 (D.
Colo. 1993).
16. FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Camp. Comm., 59 F.3d 1015, 1023 n.10 (10th
Cir. 1995).
17. Id. at 1019-23.
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party spending could be constitutionally applied to spending with
an "electioneering message" concerning a clearly identified candidate. The court found that the Republican ad did have an electioneering message with respect to Wirth and, thus, that the
FECA limit applied. Since the state Republicans had transferred
their statutory spending authority to the NRSC, their expenditures violated the FECA ceiling on coordinated party spending.
The court then briefly considered and rejected the Republican
claim that the FECA limit was unconstitutional.
II. THE BUCKLEY DOCTRINE AND PARTY SPENDING
A. BASIC ELEMENTS OF BUCKLEY
In both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court, the analysis of the constitutionality of the FECA spending limits was
framed by Buckley v. Valeo. Although "one of the most vilified
Supreme Court decisions of the post-World War II era,"18 Buckley has for two decades dominated judicial review of campaign
finance regulations.
Buckley has three major elements. First, the Court determined that campaign finance regulations impinge on the core
First Amendment concerns of political expression and association. Without quite concluding that "money is speech," the Court
found that money is essential for the dissemination of political
messages and that contributing money "enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political
goals."19 As a result, government regulation of campaign finances would be subject to "the exacting scrutiny required by the
First Amendment."20
Second, and more controversially, the Court determined
that the sole justification for limiting political spending is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption. The
Court rejected the argument that restrictions could be used to
promote equality of political influence among individuals or
groups or to equalize candidates' resources. 2 1 As the Court "famously or notoriously"22 asserted: "the concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order
18. Cass R. Sunstein, PoliticalEquality and Unintended Consequences,94 Colum. L.
Rev. 1390, 1394 (1994).
19. 424 U.S. at 22. See also id. at 65-66.
20. Id. at 16.
21. Id. at 48-49, 56-57. The Court also rejected the argument that the government
could restrict spending in order to limit the cost of political campaigns. Id. at 57.
22. David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 1369, 1369 (1994).
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to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment."23
Third, the Court drew an operational distinction between
expenditures-that is, spending by candidates, organizations and
individuals on direct communications with voters-and contributions-that is, payments by an individual or group to a candidate,
which the candidate uses to fund political communication with
the voters. Expenditures were held to be core political speech
and not to raise a danger of the corruption of candidates. As a
result, Buckley invalidated FECA's restrictions on expenditures
by candidates and independent committees.
Contributions, by contrast, were given less protection. Unlike an expenditure, a contribution does not entail an expression
of political views: "A contribution serves as a general expression
of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support." The expressive component of a contribution "rests solely on the undifferentiated,
symbolic act of contributing." In contrast, the size of the contribution "does not increase perceptibly" the quantity of the contributor's communication. "While contributions may result in
political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to
present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions
into political debate involves speech by someone other than the
contributor."24
Moreover, contributions do raise the spectre of corruption:
"To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a
political quid pro quo from current and potential officeholders,
the integrity of our system of representative government is undermined."25 Congress-and state and local governments regulating campaigns for state and local offices-could thus impose
dollar limits on the size of contributions.
B.

PROBLEMS WITH APPLYING BUCKLEY

Although the Buckley framework appears straightforward,
the Court has had great difficulty with campaign finance cases.26
23. 424 U.S. at 48-49.
24. Id. at 21.
25. Id. at 26-27.
26. The Buckley decision commanded a 6-2 majority, although three members of the
court dissented from portions of the per curiam opinion. The next major campaign fi-

nance case, FirstNat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) drew four dissents.
The critical opinion in California Med. Ass'n v. FEC,453 U.S. 182 (1981) was joined only
by a plurality. CitizensAgainst Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) drew
one dissent and three concurring Justices who endorsed a narrower rationale than Chief
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The Court has run into three problems: (i) applying the contribution/expenditure distinction; (ii) determining the meaning of corruption; and (iii) deciding the degree of deference to be accorded
to Congress or state and local elected officials-and the extent of
consideration given to empirical evidence presented by litigants
defending campaign finance restrictions-in determining
whether the kinds of dangers which the Court has indicated may
be the basis of regulation actually exist in a particular case.
(1) Drawing the Contribution/ExpenditureLine: The contributionlexpenditure distinction so central to the analysis in Buckley and later cases has proven difficult to apply. Some campaign
practices-a candidate's donation of personal funds to her own
campaign, or expenditures by groups not connected with a candidate expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate-are arguably both contributions and
expenditures. The candidate's donation to her own campaign is
in form a contribution, yet it funds the candidate's own speech so
it resembles an expenditure.27 Independent expenditures are formally expenditures but raise the possibility that a candidate who
benefits from an independent committee's support will feel an
obligation to the spender comparable to that created by a
contribution.28
Other practices-such as a contribution to a political organization or intermediary for election-related purposes-are arguably neither contributions nor expenditures within the Buckley
analysis. A contribution to an intermediary is plainly not an expenditure, but, given the lack of a direct tie between donor and
candidate, it may not present the vice Buckley found in
contributions.29
Justice Burger's opinion for the Court. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee, 470 U.S. 480 (1984) drew two dissents. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizensfor Life,
479 U.S. 238 (1986) and Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990) were marked by 5-4 and 6-3 splits and multiple opinions. Of the major constitutional cases, only FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982) produced a unanimous Court.
27. Buckley treated a candidate's contribution of personal funds to her own campaign as an expenditure for First Amendment purposes. 424 U.S. at 51-54. Justice Marshall, who joined all other aspects of Buckley, dissented from this point. Id. at 286-87.
28. The Court has held that independent expenditures undertaken without "prearrangement and coordination" with a candidate are to be treated as expenditures for First
Amendment purposes. Id. at 39-51. Accord, NationalConservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 497501. But see id. at 502, 510-11 (White, J., dissenting); 518-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
But cf. Austin, 494 U.S. at 668-69 (upholding prohibition on spending by corporations).
29. See, e.g., CaliforniaMedicalAss'n v. FEC,453 U.S. 182 (1981); Citizens Against
Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); FECv. Nat'l Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
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And proposals to impose limits on the total amount of contributions candidates can receive from particular categories of
donors, such as political action committees,30 or to impose very
low contribution limits,31 point up the constitutionally troublesome fact that all expenditures, except those funded by a candidate's personal wealth, ultimately derive from contributions.
The difficulty of applying the contribution/expenditure distinction is closely connected to the distinction's shaky justification. It might be easier to draw the line if the Court had been
more persuasive in explaining why the line ought to be drawn.
The Court's effort to establish that contributions are a lower order of speech than expenditures (assuming that both are constitutionally protected speech) seems increasingly tenuous. For
candidates, in the absence of public funding, contribution limits
necessarily curtail the expenditures of all but the wealthiest, selffunding candidates, or force them to shift their activities from
actually communicating with voters to prospecting among donors
for funds,32 thus reducing the amount of public political speech.
For donors, a contribution is a device for pooling individual
views and enabling them to be amplified by a candidate-who
can be a "great communicator"-thus providing more effective
dissemination of those views than if the donor had spent an identical sum on expenditures to speak to the voters directly.
Contribution limits are particularly problematic from the
perspective of freedom of association. Contributions may be only
indirect speech-"speech by proxy"33-but they are a direct
form of association. If speech is infringed by spending limits, then
freedom of association ought to be comparably infringed by contribution ceilings that limit the amount of support an individual
can give to a campaign. Indeed, in cases since Buckley the Court
has given greater weight to freedom of association in reviewing
campaign regulations.34 Increasingly, the justification for the con30.

Cf. Gard v. Wisconsin State Elec. Bd., 456 N.W.2d 809, 812,829 (Wis.), cert. den.

498 U.S. 982 (1990) (sustaining absolute dollar cap on funding a candidate may receive
from all committees, including PACs and party committees).
31. See, e.g., Carverv. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995) (invalidating low contribution limit); National Black Police Ass'n v. D.C. Bd. of Elec. and Ethics, 924 F. Supp. 270
(D.D.C. 1996) (same).
32. For a forceful argument concerning the constitutional significance of the diversion of officeholders' time to fundraising, see Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening
Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why CampaignSpending Limits May Not Violate the FirstAmendment After All, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1281 (1994).
33. Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (plurality opinion).
34. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control,454 U.S. at 295-99; FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 251-56 (plurality opinion); id. at 265-66 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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tribution limits, and for the contribution/expenditure distinction,
appears to rely less on the lower status of contributions than on
the greater dangers contributions are said to pose for the political
process.
(2) The Meaning of Corruption:Preventing corruption and
the appearance of corruption "are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting
campaign finances."35 The Court, however, has never actually defined what it means by "corruption or the appearance of corruption." "Corruption" is sometimes equated with "improper
influence" or "undue influence" over officeholders-without
analysis of the distinction between proper and improper influences. Typically, the Court has given the notion of corruption a
narrow reading, akin to bribery. As then-Justice Rehnquist asserted in FEC v. National Conservative PoliticalAction Committee ("NCPAC"), "[tihe hallmark of corruption is the financial
quid pro quo: dollars for political favors."36 In this vision, the
corruption concern is triggered only by the exchange of favors or
the possibility of (and the appearance of the possibility of) the
exchange of favors between donors and elected officials.
If corruption means exchange of favors, then the contribution/expenditure distinction may be sound in principle-contributions raise the possibility of the exchange of favors, whereas
direct communications to the voters by candidates or interest
groups do not involve such exchanges. But gross inequalities in
spending by candidates, interest groups, or other political organizations that do not involve quid pro quos are not considered corrupting and thus cannot be barred by restrictions on spending.
With corruption as quid pro quo, moreover, some hard cases,
such as the issue of a candidate's use of personal wealth, become
easy since the candidate cannot corrupt herself.
On other occasions, however, the Court has suggested that
"corruption" may be read more broadly to include the spending
of large sums of money that have an "undue influence on the
outcome" of an election and thereby undermine "the confidence
of the people in the democratic process and the integrity of government."37 If corruption includes the influence that large sums
of money can have on the outcome of an election-whether be35. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97.
36. Id. at 497.
37. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978). See also
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 301 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); id at 302-03 (Blackmun, J., and O'Connor, J., concurring).
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cause such influence is itself corrupting38 or because it jeopardizes "voter confidence in government"39-then expenditures
can be as corrupting as contributions and expenditures could be
limited in the name of preventing corruption and the appearance
of corruption.
Prior to 1990 the Court had never found evidence that the
potential to engage in unlimited spending posed a threat to voter
confidence in government adequate to justify a spending restriction, but in that year Austin v. Michigan Chamberof Commerce40
upheld a state law restricting corporate political expenditures by
finding that the state could justify the law as necessary to control
"the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth" which could "unfairly influence elections when . . .
deployed in the form of independent expenditures."41 If undue
influence on the electoral process-and not just undue influence
over elected officials, which is the sole focus of the quid pro quo
model-could become a basis for campaign finance restrictions,
then both the practical ability and the normative rationale for
distinguishing between contributions and expenditures for First
Amendment purposes would be substantially eroded.
To be sure, central to Austin and other cases dealing with
limits on corporate political activity was the Court's assertion
that corporations pose a unique danger of corruption. Corporations enjoy a "unique state-conferred corporate structure"42 that
enables them to accumulate large sums of money. These financial
resources reflect the success of the corporation's commercial activities and not the extent of support for its political ideas. Limits
on corporations are justifiable "to ensure that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go
with the corporate form of organization... [are] not converted
into political 'war chests'."43
Austin's attempt to limit its concern with large campaign war
chests to corporations is unpersuasive. In FirstNational Bank of
38. Cf. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990) (referring to the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth" and
asserting that "[c]orporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in
the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of political
contributions").
39. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 302 (Blackmun, J., and O'Connor, J.,

concurring).
40.
41.
42.
43.

494 U.S. 652 (1990).
Id. at 660.
Id. at 659-60.
FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982).
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Boston v. Bellotti,44 its first case dealing with corporate political
spending, the Court emphasized that the touchstone for analysis
was "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity
for informing the public ... not ... the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual."45 The
corporate status of the speaker, then, ought to be irrelevant to an
assessment of the basis for regulating the speech. It is hard to see
why state-granted advantages make corporate speech more corrupting. Moreover, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his Austin dissent, corporations are not alone in receiving special advantages
from the state.4 6 Nor are corporations unique in their capacity to
divert wealth obtained in the economic marketplace to political
purposes. Other business associations-as well as billionaire individuals who benefit from inheritance laws or obtain their wealth
from investments in corporations-may build up campaign war
chests "that have little or no correlation to the public's support
for the[ir] ... political ideas."47
Nonetheless, whatever the logical difficulties of limiting Austin's more expansive notion of "corruption" to corporations, that
is what the Court asserted it did. As a result, "quid pro quo"
remains the dominant model of "corruption," and the "undue influence over electoral outcomes" definition of corruption has
been limited to cases involving corporations. Still, Austin-the
last campaign finance case prior to Colorado Republicanopened up the possibility of a broader meaning of corruption,
including a concern with the kinds of inequalities Buckley dismissed. And, as Archibald Cox observed, "[o]nce loosed, the
idea of Equality is not easily cabined."48
(3) Degree of Deference to Elected Decisionmakers:The constitutionality of the regulation of independent expenditures is an
empirical question as well as a normative one. Even if the mean44. 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
45. Id. at 777. Bellotti differed from Austin in one important respect. Bellotti involved corporate spending in a referendum election, whereas Austin addressed independent corporate spending in a candidate election. That difference would have significance if
"corruption" were limited to the danger of quid pro quos, since the Court has determined
that referenda and other ballot questions do not present the danger of an exchange of
favors between special interests and officeholders. Id. at 790. However, Austin's expansion of "corruption" to include "undue influence" over election outcomes eliminates the
significance of that difference. If Austin really is a "corporations" case, it is in direct tension with Bellotti.
46. Austin, 494 U.S. at 680.
47. Id. at 652. See Ashdown, Controlling Campaign Spending and the 'New Corruption': Waitingfor the Court,44 Vand. L. Rev. 767, 783-84 (1991).
48. Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of
Human Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 91 (1966).
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ing of corruption were clear, and even if it were limited to the
quid pro quo model, it would still be debatable whether the danger of corruption is present in a particular setting.
Thus, a legislature might conclude that expenditures by independent committees supporting or opposing particular candidates might raise the prospect of quid pro quo corruption.
Similarly, even if an individual's contribution to a political action
committee or other political organization raises no question of
the individual corrupting the organization, a legislature might
conclude that there was sufficient danger that donors might use
such intermediaries as conduits for the exchange of favors with
the candidates who receive contributions from the intermediary,
so that contributions by individuals to political organizations that
do not run candidates for office ought to be regulated. In addition, a legislature has to make the very basic decision of how
large (or, perhaps, how small) a contribution raises the danger of
corruption.
The Court thus has to decide how much deference to give to
the elected decisionmakers in determining whether a particular
campaign practice presents a danger of corruption. But the
Court's standard of deference has ranged widely. In Buckley the
Court deferred to Congress concerning the level of limits on individual donations to candidates, and the overall limit on individual contributions to political committees in a calendar year.
Sustaining FECA's low reporting and recordkeeping thresholds,
Buckley stated "we cannot require Congress to establish that it
has chosen the highest reasonable threshold." That "line" was
"best left ... to congressional discretion" and was upheld because it was not "wholly without rationality"49-a remarkably relaxed standard given the Court's finding that the reporting and
disclosure rules implicate fundamental rights and are subject to
"exacting scrutiny."50 Similarly, the Court has also deferred to a
Congressional judgment that contributions to intermediary organizations could be regulated because of the danger that those organizations might serve as conduits linking their donors to
candidates.51
On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly rejected Congressional judgments that expenditures by independent committees raise dangers of corruption. Relying on its own armchair
empiricism, Buckley found that because of the "absence of prear49. 424 U.S. at 83.
50. Id. at 64.
51. California Med. Ass'n v. FEC,453 U.S. 182, 197-98, 201 (1981).
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rangement and coordination," such expenditures "may well provide little assistance" to a candidate's campaign and, thus,
alleviate the danger of a quid pro quo. A decade later NCPAC
reaffirmed this position, notwithstanding evidence that independent committees had played an important role in the 1980 presidential race, largely in support of Ronald Reagan.
Critics of independent spending had urged that candidates
and independent committees had found ways to use the independent committees to bolster candidates even in the absence
of formal "prearrangement and coordination," and that organizers of the pro-Reagan independent committees had received appointments in the Reagan Administration.52 But
NCPAC found that on the record before it "an exchange of political favors for uncoordinated expenditures remains a hypothetical possibility and nothing more,"53 even though the trial court
excluded most of the evidence of corruption proferred by the
FEC-a decision which the Supreme Court sustained.54 Thus, a
strong evidentiary burden is placed on those who would regulate
independent expenditures-with the Court unwilling to look at
much of the evidence.
In the corporations cases the Court's vacillation has been
acute. In different cases, it has dismissed out of hand the argument that corporations present any danger of undue influence;S5
deferred to a Congressional or state legislative judgment that
corporations in general present unique dangers, without requiring that regulation be limited to corporations that actually amass
the wealth necessary to fund a war chest that poses a danger of
undue influence;56 and upheld regulation in principle but required Congress to target only those corporations whose war
chests are divorced from political support.5 7
Outside the corporate context, the Court's rule appears to
be: As contributions in general raise the danger of corruption,
Congress may regulate them without showing that a particular
type of contribution raises any danger, but as expenditures in
general raise little danger of corruption, Congress must meet an
exacting burden of demonstrating that a particular expenditure
raises the danger of corruption. The stringency of review thus
52. See, e.g., Elizabeth Drew, Politicsand Money 136-41 (Macmillan, 1983); Herbert
E. Alexander, Financingthe 1980 Election 142 (Lexington Books, 1983).
53. 470 U.S. at 498.
54.

Id. at 499-500.

55. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789.
56. FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982).
57. See, e.g., FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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seems to turn on the Court's own antecedent judgment of the
relative degree of danger a practice presents, even though legislative findings or empirical evidence are supposed to be the basis
of the Court's determination of whether a danger justifying regulation is present.
C.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FECA LIMITS ON PARTY SPENDING

The FECA limit on party spending potentially raises-and
intertwines-all three questions that have plagued the application of Buckley. Party spending blurs the expenditure/contribution distinction. It is formally an expenditure, but given the close
ties between parties and their candidates, party spending could
plausibly be treated as a contribution. FECA and the FEC treat
party spending like contributions and impose dollar limits.
Should the judgment of the political branches receive deference,
or should the Court engage in its own non-deferential assessment
of the dangers posed by party spending?
Does party committee spending pose a danger of the corruption of candidates? Does the close relationship between a party
and its candidate that makes the contribution/expenditure distinction so difficult to apply undermine the concern with party
corruption of a candidate-or does it just make the concern
stronger? What would corruption mean in this context? Can
party committee spending be regulated because of the danger
that the party will be a conduit for interest group or wealthy individual donations? Can party spending committees be regulated
to prevent one party from having an undue influence over the
election? What weight should be given to the judgment of Congress or the FEC that party spending presents some danger of
corruption?

The Colorado Republican Court failed to reach a consensus
on any of these issues, leaving the extent of deference to Congress, the categorization of party-spending within the Buckley
framework, the meaning of corruption in the party-candidate
context, and the constitutionality of the regulation of party
spending outside the particular facts of the anti-Wirth ad,
unresolved.
III. THE FRAGMENTED COLORADO
REPUBLICAN COURT
ColoradoRepublican produced four opinions, none of which

garnered the support of more than three Justices. Four Justices,
in two opinions joined by three Justices apiece-with two Justices
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joining both opinions-were willing to strike down FECA's limits on party spending coordinated with candidates. 'Two Justices
voted to validate FECA's limits and to enforce the FEC's suit
against the Colorado Republican Party. Three Justices determined that the FECA restriction could not be constitutionally
applied against the anti-Wirth ad campaign but declined to consider the broader question of the constitutionality of limits on
party spending. Moreover, none of the opinions considered the
question that had divided the lower courts in this and other
cases-whether FECA's limits can be applied to speech that falls
short of express advocacy but contains an "electioneering
message."
A. THE

PLURALITY OPINION

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, determined that the FECA limit on coordinated expenditures could
not be applied to the anti-Wirth ad because the Colorado Republican Party had not, in fact, coordinated the ads with any Republican candidate. The Colorado Republican spending was, thus,
truly independent spending and, like the independent spending
of "individuals, candidates and ordinary political committees"
could not be subject to limitation.58
First, the plurality found that the anti-Wirth spending was
not in fact coordinated with any Republican candidate. The ads
were aired at a time when there were three Republicans contending for the Senate nomination so there was no general election
candidate. Moreover, the impetus for the ad had come from the
state party chairman, who had "arranged for the development of
the script at his own initiative." Work on the script was limited to
state party staff; the senate contenders and their staffs were not
involved.59
Second, the plurality rejected the FEC's argument that party
committees are incapable of making expenditures independent
of their party's candidates, since the FEC failed to provide any
empirical support, either in its advisory opinions or in its arguments before the Court, for this assertion.60 Moreover, the statute itself did not clearly preclude a finding that some party
spending could be independent.
58. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2317
(1996).
59. Id. at 2315.
60. Id. at 2318.
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Finally, Justice Breyer concluded that the government
presented no evidence that independent spending by parties
presents any greater dangers of corruption than the independent
spending of other political committees or individuals. Once
again, "the absence of prearrangement and coordination" was
said to "alleviate" the danger of a quid pro quo.61 Comparing
independent spending by party committees and individuals, "the
constitutionally significant fact, present equally in both instances,
is the lack of coordination between the candidate and the source
of the expenditure."62
Having determined that FECA's limits on coordinated expenditures could not constitutionally be applied to an expenditure that was independent-in-fact, the plurality declined to reach
the general question of the constitutionality of FECA's limits on
party spending. Indeed, the plurality avoided any statement that
parties enjoy a constitutionally preferred position with respect to
campaign finance. The plurality rejected the argument, embraced
by one of the concurrences, that "a party and its candidate are
identical,"63 and, in stressing the significance of the independence of the anti-Wirth spending in avoiding the danger of corruption, it implicitly rejected the contention of the other
concurrence that parties are incapable of corrupting their candidates.64 Indeed, the plurality commented that parties "share relevant features with many PACs."65
The Breyer opinion managed to block the application of the
FECA limit to the anti-Wirth ad while doing minimal damage to
the overall structure of FECA and avoiding the tensions in the
Buckley framework. The plurality minimized the significance of
its lack of deference to the political branches by noting that the
FEC had failed to do the homework necessary to prove that "independent" party spending is impossible in fact, and that Congress's authorization of party coordinated expenditures up to a
statutory ceiling did not preclude a finding that some party expenditures could be truly independent.
Thus, although the idea of "independent" party spending
creates a hole in FECA it appears to reflect the plurality's effort
to adhere to Buckley's contribution/expenditure distinction.
Party committees were presumed to be like other political committees-some party spending might be coordinated with candi61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2316.
at 2317.
at 2319.
at 2316.
at 2320.
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dates and some might be independent. Indeed, noting that
coordinated party expenditures "share some of the constitutionally relevant features" of both expenditures and contributions,
the plurality gave the very inability of party spending to fit neatly
into Buckley's conceptual boxes as a reason for not addressing
the Republicans' broader challenge to the constitutionality of the
limits on party spending. 66
B.

TiE CONCURRING OPINIONS

Four Justices in two overlapping groups of three concurred
in the judgment but dissented from the plurality's reasoning: they
would have completely invalidated FECA's ceiling on coordinated party spending. Justice Kennedy's opinion rejected the
idea of party independence from candidates, but concluded that,
whether or not coordinated with their candidates, party spending
ought to be treated as constitutionally protected expenditures.
Justice Thomas's opinion urged that since party spending
presents only a minimal danger of corruption there is no constitutional basis for its limitation.
Justice Kennedy's opinion explicitly rejected the plurality's
emphasis on the independence of the Colorado Republicans'
spending. Instead, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, Justice Kennedy stressed the "practical identity of interests between the two entities [parties and their candidates] during an election" and the "tradition of political parties and their
candidates engaging in joint First Amendment activity." 67 Rather
than look to independence-in-fact of a particular expenditure, he
concluded that a party's "fate in an election is inextricably intertwined with that of its candidates."68
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that party spending would
generally function as a contribution to a candidate, but found
that such spending also represents the party's speech on its own
behalf since "in the context of particular elections, candidates are
necessary to make the party's message known and effective, and
vice versa."69 As the political speech of a political association,
party spending, even spending coordinated with the candidate a
party supports, could not constitutionally be limited.
Justice Thomas's opinion, also joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, took a slightly different tack. Justice
66.

Id.

67. Id. at 2323.
68.

Id.

69. Id. at 2322.

1997]

CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Thomas ridiculed the assertion that there was any danger of corruption in a party supporting its own candidate. Justice Thomas
considered two possible sources of corruption: the influence of
the party itself on the candidate, and the influence of a party's
donors. Justice Thomas denied that party influence per se could
ever be considered corruptive. "The very aim of a political party
is to influence its candidate's stance on issues." If a party succeeds "that is not corruption; that is successful advocacy of ideas
in the political marketplace and representative government in a
party system."70
As for any danger that coordinated party spending might
provide an opportunity for donors to the party to exert undue
influence over the party's nominee, Justice Thomas noted that
the "numerous members with a wide variety of interests" found
in parties makes it unlikely that any one person or interest group
could use a party to exact a quid pro quo from a candidate. The
influence of particular interests would be "significantly diffused"
by other interests. Further, there is "little risk" that a party could
be used by wealthy donors as a conduit for corrupting candidates
so long as the Court "continues to permit Congress to subject
individuals to limits on the amount they can give to parties"71although in another part of his opinion, not joined by any other
Justice, Justice Thomas urged that contribution caps be held
unconstitutional.72
C. Ti- DissEwNr
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented in a
brief opinion.73 The dissent agreed with Justice Kennedy that a
party and its candidate have "a unique relationship" which precludes Justice Breyer's finding of independence. The dissenting
Justices, however, concluded that Congress could constitutionally
limit party spending.
Disagreeing with Justice Thomas, Justice Stevens found that
party coordinated spending could be corrupting-or, rather, that
Congress could find it so-first, because it could give a party, "or
the persons who control the party" influence "over the candidate
by virtue of its power to spend," and, second, because of the danger of conduit corruption.74
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 2331.
Id.
Id. at 2329.
Id. at 2332.

74.

Id.
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In addition, Justice Stevens asserted that limits on party
spending were justified by the government's "important interest
in levelling the electoral playing field by constraining the cost of
federal campaigns."75
IV. ANALYSIS: PLACING PARTIES IN THE
BUCKLEY FRAMEWORK
A. INDEPENDENCE-IN-FACT?
Despite its clever use of the idea of independence-in-fact to
avoid addressing the constitutional challenge raised by the Colorado Republican Party, the plurality opinion causes considerable
problems on its own. First, it is highly fact-dependent, without
making clear exactly the facts on which it depends. The antiWirth ad campaign occurred before the party had nominated a
candidate, indeed, while the nomination was still contested by
several candidates. Is that essential, or can a party engage in independent spending on behalf of the likely nominee-including
an incumbent-or even for the actual nominee, provided that
formal contact between the candidate and the party committee is
avoided?
And exactly what formal contact has to be avoided? Justice
Breyer's opinion emphasized the lack of coordination with respect to the advertising campaign itself.76 Can a party committee
that provides a candidate with computer services, polling data,
assistance in training staff, fundraising and even funds,77 engage
in an "independent" media campaign on the candidate's behalf if
it avoids direct contact with the candidate and the candidate's
committee with respect to advertising strategy?
Second, to the extent that party committees
care to
minimize their actual cooperation with candidates, take
the plurality
opinion could have the potentially perverse consequence-perverse, that is, from the perspective of those who have called for a
more party-centered campaign finance system as a way of promoting party accountability in government-of driving parties
away from their candidates. The modem trend in Congressional
campaigns has been for party committees, especially the Republican and Democratic campaign committees, to take a greater role
75.
76.

Id.
Id. at 2315.

77. For a description of the kinds of services party committees now provide their
candidates, see Larry J. Sabato, The Party's Just Begun: Shaping Political Parties for
America's Future 75-81 (Scott, Foresman, 1988); Paul S. Hermson, Party Campaigning in
the 1980s 47-83 (Harvard U. Press, 1988).
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in recruiting candidates, assisting candidates with their campaigns, and, especially, helping candidates with communications,
including the development of issue positions and the actual production of advertising.78 One result has been a "greater nationalization of campaign themes,"79 which may be a step toward
greater party cohesion with respect to major issues.
The plurality's approach could force parties to choose between providing financial support to their candidates and working with those candidates on their campaign agendas. Thus,
greater independent party spending might actually reinforce,
rather than undermine, the candidate-centered campaigns that
party government advocates have criticized.
Third, Colorado Republican will make it difficult for the
FEC to enforce the ceiling on coordinated expenditures that the
plurality was careful to avoid upsetting. As journalists and scholars who have examined "independent" spending by non-party
political committees have observed, "[t]here are all manners of
ways in which people running 'independent' campaigns can run
them in tandem with the candidates" without formal consultation.so The prospects for tacit cooperation are far greater in the
candidate-party context given the likelihood of ongoing ties between parties and their candidates, the involvement of many candidates in their parties, and the stakes parties have in the success
of their candidates. The FEC, which has never been known for its
timely or vigorous enforcement of the campaign finance laws,81 is
poorly situated to police the relationships between candidates
and committees, or to carry the heavy burden of proving that
independence-in-fact has been compromised in a particular case.
Although the FEC may have erred in concluding that independence-in-fact is never possible, it seems likely that it is relatively rare. The presumption of coordination may have been an
administratively useful prophylactic rule for enforcing the statutory ban on coordinated expenditures.82 By forcing the FEC to
78. See, e.g., Hermson, Party Campaigningin the 1980s at 60-65 (cited in note 77).
79. Id. at 64.
80. See Drew, Politics and Money at 136-41 (cited in note 52); Alexander, Financing
the 1980 Election at 142 (cited in note 52).
81. At least part of the FEC's difficulties derive from the weak institutional structure imposed by Congress. See Brooks Jackson, Broken Promise: Why the FederalElection Commission Failed (Priority Press, 1990).
82. The plurality in Colorado Republican noted that "[t]he Commission has not
claimed ... that, administratively speaking, it is more difficult to separate a political
party's 'independent' from its 'coordinated' expenditures than, say, those of a PAC," 116
S. Ct. at 2318, but as the Colorado Republican Party had not argued that its spending was
"independent" and not "coordinated" spending, it is not clear why the FEC would have
thought it necessary to defend its position that all party spending is coordinated spending.
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make the case not simply that party spending occurred but that
the party committee actually cooperated with a candidate, the
plurality may have invalidated the FECA limit in practice even
as it strained to avoid doing so in theory.
Finally, the whole notion of party "independent" spending
seems formalistic and naive. Seeing the trees but not the forest,
the plurality's tight focus on the absence of party-candidate discussion of a particular ad misses the web of relationships that
link parties to their candidates' campaigns. Parties back candidates and provide them with financial and logistical support.
Candidates run on party lines, belong to parties, are often active
in party organizations, and are frequently identified in terms of
their party affiliation. Party committees, in turn, define their mission as the election of candidates bearing the party label. The
protection of independent spending enables groups or individuals with independent agendas-that is, concerns other than the
outcome of elections-to communicate their views with respect
to elections to the voters. But the principal agenda of a political
party committee is the election of the party's candidates.83 The
Colorado Republican Party's ad campaign was intended to
weaken Tim Wirth and to elect a Republican-any Republican
who might be nominated-not to further nonpartisan ideological
or economic goals.
In finding that parties could engage in independent spending, Justice Breyer sought to assure parties parity with PACs,
other political committees, and individuals. But given their ongoing ties to candidates, and their focus on electing candidates, parties are not quite comparable to these other participants in the
political process. That does not mean that they should receive
less constitutional protection or more protection; it means simply
that the effort to treat parties just like these other political actors
is unpersuasive.
As the other Colorado Republican opinions demonstrate,
however, it is not easy to determine exactly what rights parties
ought to enjoy, or to situate that determination within the Buckley doctrine.
B. PARTY-CANDIDATE IDENTITY?
Central to Justice Kennedy's opinion is the claim that parties
have a distinctive relationship with candidates which provides
83. See, e.g., Gerald M. Pomper, Passions and Interests: PoliticalParty Concepts of
American Democracy 3-4 (U. Press of Kansas, 1992) ("Parties are unique in their nominal
unity and electoral focus.").
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parties with a constitutional right to engage in unlimited campaign spending. Although the notion of a distinctive relationship
seems right-and the failure to acknowledge that relationship is
the Achilles' heel of the plurality opinion-it is not obvious why
the result is unlimited party spending.
Initially, Justice Kennedy's opinion somewhat exaggerates
the distinction between party committees and other political
committees in terms of the relationship between committees and
candidates. As the rise of "generic" party advertising indicates,
parties are not entirely dependent on candidate campaigns to get
their message across. Parties can and do spend money to voice
party positions apart from urging the election or defeat of specific candidates. On the other hand, non-party committees might
believe that the most effective way to get their message across is
by supporting the campaign of a particular candidate. Certainly,
if a candidate has embraced a controversial position on a particular issue-such as gun control, health care, or abortion-organizations sharing that issue position might assert "a practical
identity of interests" between themselves and the candidate during the pendency of the campaign.
The real difference between parties and other committees is
the structural inability of parties to pursue their goals with respect to candidate elections independently of their candidates'
campaigns. Other political committees can mount independent
campaigns. Given the web of ties between candidates and parties,
it would be "impractical and imprudent," if not impossible, for
parties to mount independent campaigns.84
But that does not mean that limits on coordinated spending
"stifle" a party's voice. If, as Justice Kennedy contends, there is a
"practical identity" between party and candidate, then presumably the party's message is being advanced by its nominee. As
long as the party's candidate-its designated representative in
the election-has a right of unlimited spending, then the FECA
limits on coordinated spending cannot limit the communication
of the party's message, since the candidate's spending will convey
that message to the voters.
Ironically, the real problem with the FECA limits may derive not from party-candidate identity but from the existence of
some differences between party and candidate interests. Party
committees have such a major stake in the electoral success of
their nominees that true independence is extremely unlikely, yet
84.

116 S. Ct. at 2323.
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party committees may also have their own distinctive interestssuch as the concern of party bureaucrats and professionals in
maintaining the party as an organization-not represented by the
candidate. Restrictions on party coordinated spending may limit
the ability of party committees to advance those particular
interests.
The constitutionality of the FECA limits then turns on the
central Buckley questions of whether coordinated party spending
presents dangers of corruption or the appearance of corruptionwhich also entails consideration of the degree of deference due
to the political branches in making that judgment. Justice Kennedy's opinion failed to address the question of corruption.
Whether party spending can corrupt was, however, the focus of
the Justice Thomas's concurrence and Justice Stevens's dissent.
C.

PARTY-CANDIDATE CORRUPTION?

(1) Conduit Corruption:85Justice Thomas appears to be on
shaky ground in his quick dismissal of the dangers of conduit corruption. Clever party manipulation of the provision added to
FECA in 1979 exempting money for state and local level volunteer activity and voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives
from the Act's contribution and expenditure limitationsS6-socalled "soft money"-has eroded the significance of FECA's limits on donations to party committees.87 Although the law permitting soft money contributions restricts their use, the funds
support party-building activities and free up federally regulated
contributions for use in candidates' campaigns.8s Thus, both candidates and parties benefit from large soft money contributions.
A relatively small number of "high rollers" play an important role in party fund-raising. More than sixty contributors gave
the Republican National Committee at least $100,000 apiece in
85. After the submission of this Comment, a major campaign finance scandal involving the activities of the Democratic National Committee surfaced during the final weeks
of the 1996 presidential campaign. This scandal confirms the significance of the conduit
corruption concern raised in this section. Although the discussion in text gives more attention to the activities of the Republican National Committee, the activities of DNC
fundraisers in 1996 amply demonstrates that conduit corruption is a serious danger for
both parties. Further analysis of the fundraising activities of the major parties in the 1996
election is beyond the scope of this Comment.
86. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(v), (x), (xi), (xii) (1994); 2 U.S.C.§ 431(9)(B)(iv), (viii),
(ix) (1994).
87. The literature on "soft money" is legion. For a description of the history of soft
money and its role in the 1992 election, see Herbert E. Alexander and Anthony Corrado,
Financingthe 1992 Election 147-75 (M.E. Sharpe, 1995).
88. Brooks Jackson, Honest Graft: Big Money and the American Political Process
146 (Knopf, 1988).
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soft money in the 1991-92 campaign, while the Democrats received gifts of more than $100,000 from seventy-two donors, including nearly $400,000 from the steelworkers union and nearly
$350,000 from the National Education Association.89 Some interests loom large in the financing of particular parties. For example, between January 1, 1995 and June 30, 1996-that is, well
before the peak months of the 1996 presidential campaign-national Republican committees received $1.6 million from Philip
Morris Co., $970,000 from RJR Nabisco, $448,000 from US Tobacco, $400,000 from Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., and
$300,000 from the Tobacco Institute.90 These are pretty large
sums to be "diffused"-and there is at least anecdotal evidence
of national Republican officials seeking to make state officeholders more attentive to the tobacco industry's interests.91 Moreover, the parties have taken steps to promote direct contact, at
meals, private meetings, and policy retreats, between their major
financial backers and elected officeholders.92
As the soft money gifts suggest, a broad-based party can
serve as a conduit for more narrow interests. Like Justice
Thomas, many advocates of a more party-centered campaign finance system have argued that an expanded party role would dilute the influence of big special interest donors.93 The growing
role of special interest contributions in party finances, however,
casts doubt on this sunny scenario. Removing limits on party
spending without providing for public funding would almost certainly increase the parties' incentives to pursue large contributions, and concomitantly increase the prospects of special

89. See Alexander and Corrado, Financing the 1992 Elections at 153-56 (cited in
note 87).
90. Top "Soft Money" Contributors to Republican Party Committees, Wash. Post,
Aug. 14, 1996, at A19.
91. See, e.g., Timothy Noah, GOP's Chief Pushed Pro-tobaccoBill at State Level,
Arizona Lawmaker Says, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1996, at A20 (RNC National Chairman
Haley Barbour phoned the Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives to pressure
Wall St. J., March 1, 1996, at Al
him into supporting a pro-tobacco bill); Tobacco ies,
(reporting that Haley Barbour called Texas Governor Bush's office to check on status of
bill to restrict city anti-smoking ordinances).
92. See Jackson, Honest Graft: Big Money and the American PoliticalProcess 9-10,
98-99 (cited in note 88); Sabato, The Party's Just Begun: Shaping Political Parties for
America's Futureat 77 (cited in note 77); Herrnson, Party Campaigningin the 1980s at 3536 (cited in note 77).
93. See, e.g., Kirk J. Nahra, PoliticalPartiesand the CampaignFinanceLaws: Dilemmas, Concerns,and Opportunities, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 53 (1987); Clarisa Long, Shouting
Down the Voice of the People:PoliticalParties,Powerful PACs, and ConcernsAbout Corruption, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1994).
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interests pursuing their agendas, and securing quid pro quos,
through donations to the parties.94
Conduit corruption is at heart an issue with a strong empirical component, but Justice Thomas's opinion reflects more
armchair political science theorizing than any familiarity with
campaign finance data. On the other hand, Justice Stevens' opinion does little more than state that the possibility of conduit corruption is enough to jistify the FECA limits. If, as the Buckley
doctrine provides, party contributions are a form of constitutionally protected speech, then there ought to be at least some assessment of the seriousness of the corruption danger as a part of the
determination whether constitutionally protected speech may be
curtailed. Even deference to Congress is not the same as
abdication.
The conduit corruption issue nicely displays the importance
of questions about deference and empirical justification when
courts consider the constitutionality of campaign finance limits.
The gap between Justice Thomas and Justice Stevens demonstrates anew how the Court has been unable to resolve this central question. Unfortunately, the Court's difficulties seem to stem
not from reasonable disagreements about how to assess disputed
evidence but from an apparent unwillingness to deal seriously
with empirical evidence and legislative justifications at all. As the
Thomas and Stevens opinions reveal, the Court's two principal
approaches have been either to disregard empirical evidence or
not to require any. Surely, there is a middle position between
complete dismissal of Congress' judgment9o and evidence that
might support its action, and failure even to require that evidence be presented and defended.
(2) Party Influence Corruption:Justice Thomas's denial that
party influence per se can be corrupting would appear to have a
more substantial foundation than his summary rejection of conduit corruption. Party committee spending on behalf of candidates is far more likely to be an instance of money used to
advance shared candidate-donor interests in order to persuade
94. Brooks Jackson contended that Rep. Tony Coelho's efforts to strengthen Congressional Democrats' finances in the 1980s "actually encouraged House Democrats to
become more reliant on special interest money. The [Democratic Congressional] campaign committee gets its own funds increasingly from lobbyists, PACs, and businessmen
....

Jackson, Honest Grafti Big Money and the American PoliticalProcess at 296 (cited

in note 88).
95. According to Justice Thomas, "[t]here is good reason to think that campaign
reform is an especially inappropriate area for judicial deference to legislative judgment."
116 S. Ct. at 2330 n.9.
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voters than of money to influence a candidate to adopt or change
a position.
Nevertheless, candidate and party committee interests can
diverge. In those circumstances, Justice Stevens may well be correct in asserting that "by virtue of its power to spend" the party
may be able to exert "influence ...over the candidate."96 The
Progressive Era laws that shifted control over nominations from
party committees and conventions to primaries constituted an effort to reduce the influence of party organizations over party
candidates, presumably reflecting the notion that candidates (and
elected officials) would embrace different positions on issues of
public importance if they were less beholden to party officials.97
Moreover, there is also evidence that contemporary party committees may attempt to leverage their control over coordinated
spending to influence candidates-for example, to "persuade"
candidates to hire the committees' preferred consultants or accept the committees' strategic advice with respect to their
campaigns.98
Still, the preeminent goal of party committees is the election
of party candidates, rather than influencing the issue positions of
elected officials. Party committees will back only their own
party's candidates, whereas many other political committees, particularly non-ideological political committees, will often offer
some support to both major party candidates in a race, as a
means of ensuring an opportunity to influence whoever wins the
election.
Moreover, even if Justice Stevens is right that unlimited coordinated spending would provide the opportunity for greater
party influence over candidates, influence is not the same as corruption. The real question is whether such party influence would
be "improper" or "undue." As the cases from Buckley to Austin
demonstrate, the Court has never determined what makes influence undue, other than to indicate that large sums of money
given to a candidate or spent in coordination with the candidate
can be a source of improper influence. But the distinction between money given to influence a candidate and money given to
96. 116 S.Ct. at 2332.
97. See, e.g., Jo Freeman, PoliticalParty Contributionsand Expenditures Under the
FederalElection Campaign Act: Anomalies and Unfinished Business, 4 Pace L. Rev. 267,
290 (1984) ("Historically, there certainly has been a belief that parties were capable of
corruption. Most of the state laws regulating parties passed at the turn of the century
were intended to eliminate perceived corruption.").
98. See Herrnson, Party Campaigning in the 1980s at 57, 59 (cited in note 77).

118

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 14:91

help a candidate who is receptive to the donor's views or is otherwise politically aligned with the donor is often elusive.
Underlying Justice Thomas's concurrence is the assumption
that a party cannot "unduly" influence its candidates. Apparently
the more influence a party has over its candidates the better.
That is also the position embraced by the party-responsibility
school. The more influence a party committee has over its candidates, presumably, the greater cohesion there will be among the
party's officeholders, the more the party label will mean something in government and to the electorate, and the more the voters can look to party as a means of establishing government
accountability. There is considerable scholarly support for a
party-centered campaign finance system as a step toward creating a more "responsible" two-party system, with attendant benefits for government performance and responsiveness.99
But despite Justice Thomas's reference to "representative
government in a party system," the United States has a long tradition of candidate-centered elections coexisting with its party
system. 00 Parties are nowhere mentioned in the constitution. For
most of this century, party committees have not controlled party
nominations. Candidates have historically organized, conducted,
and financed their own campaigns. Candidates' campaigns often
emphasize a candidate's independence from party offices and
even from other elected officials of their own party. The limit on
party coordinated spending grows out of and is consistent with
this tradition.
In essence, the question of whether party committee coordinated spending raises a danger of parties corrupting candidates is
really a question of how much or how little potential for influence parties ought to be allowed to have over their candidates'
campaigns-and whether Congress or the Court should decide
this. Certainly, elected officials seem to be in a much better position to consider and combine the multiple and often conflicting
values of candidate autonomy, party responsibility, voter participation, and the potential for parties to serve as conduits for special interest influence. Elected officials are more likely to
understand the impact of the campaign finance laws on the polit-

99. See, e.g., Sabato, The Party'sJust Begun: Shaping PoliticalPartiesfor America's
Future at 185-88, 212-23 (cited in note 77).
100. See, e.g., Leon Epstein, PoliticalPartiesin the American Mold 5 (U. of Wisconsin
Press, 1986) (American "political culture" is one "in which voters choose individuals, not
merely parties, to represent them in executive and legislative offices").
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ical process and the interaction of party spending with other cam-

paign finance laws and governance generally.o1
Certainly there is no reason to believe that elected officials
are likely to be hostile to party interests. Some independent committees may be composed of political outsiders, but party committees are the ultimate political insiders. The vast majority of
elected federal and state officials are elected on party lines and
nearly all carry major party labels. All of the members of the
extremely important national party congressional campaign finance committees are members of Congress,1 02 and Congress has
deliberated various bills that would expand the parties' role. As
Republican party committees have generally outpaced their
Democratic counterparts in raising money,10 3 Republicans in
Congress have tended to make lifting the limits on donations to
parties and spending by parties a component of their campaign
finance legislative agenda.104
Party committees have not done badly under FECA. The
Act allows individuals to give national party committees $20,000
in a calendar year, and it allows political committees to give national party committees $15,000 per year, whereas the limits on
individual and committee donations to candidates are $1,000, and
$5,000, respectively, per candidate per election.105 The soft
money exemption added in 1979 has enabled the parties to raise
tens of millions of dollars for party-building activities.106 Most
101. This includes the balance of political forces between the parties. Given the
Republicans' traditionally greater success in raising funds, any change in the rules governing the party role has partisan implications as well. From a partisan perspective, Colorado Republican is a victory for Republicans in general, as well as for the Colorado
Republican Party. Of course, had either of the concurring opinions won the approval of a
majority of the Court, the Republicans' victory would have been even more substantial.
102. Hermson, Party Campaigning in the 1980s at 40 (cited in note 77); David B.
Magleby and Candice J. Nelson, The Money Chase: CongressionalCampaignFinance Reform 100-01 (Brookings Institution, 1990).
103. See, e.g., John H. Aldrich, Why Parties?The Origin and Transformationof Political Parties in America 256-58 (U. of Chicago Press, 1995); Epstein, PoliticalParties in the
American Mold 216-23 (cited in note 100); Magleby and Nelson, The Money Chase: Congressional Campaign Finance Reform at 102-12 (cited in note 102); Sabato, The Party's
Just Begun: Shaping Political Partiesfor America's Future at 75-81 (cited in note 77).
104. See, e.g., Herbert E. Alexander and Monica Bauer, Financingthe 1988 Election
117-18 (Westview Press, 1991) (discussing Republican campaign finance reform proposals); see also id. at 136 (noting partisan effects of Democratic proposals to tighten up on
soft money).
105. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1994).
106. See, e.g., Alexander and Corrado, Financingthe 1992 Election at 158 (cited in
note 87) (noting that "both parties appear to be increasingly incorporating soft money
into their overall financial schemes"). Early estimates indicate that the Democratic and
Republican party committees each raised about $100 million in soft money in the 1995-96
election cycle. See Peter H. Stone, The Green Wave, 28 Nat'l J. 2410 (Nov. 9, 1996).
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scholars of the political parties have determined that the national
parties have enjoyed greater influence with respect to the finances of their candidates' congressional campaigns since
FECA's enactment than at any other time in their history.107
Given the existence of campaign finance laws that limit both
donations to candidates and the financial activities of non-party
political committees, the concurring Justices' determination that
parties have an unlimited right to engage in coordinated spending could, if embraced by a Court majority, provide an impetus
for a more party-centered campaign finance system. This might,
as party-responsibility advocates contend, promote party cohesion and government accountability. A party-centered system
might very well be a good idea. But it would be a major departure from past and present practice. And it is hard to believe that
the decision whether to have a party-centered or candidate-centered system is a question of constitutional law, to be decided by
the Supreme Court, rather than a preeminently political question
to be decided by Congress.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF A RIGHT OF UNLIMITED
PARTY COORDINATED SPENDING FOR THE
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS
Colorado Republican came within one vote of eliminating
limits on party spending in connection with congressional campaigns. The plurality's focus on the asserted independence-in-fact
of the anti-Wirth ad campaign is unlikely to provide a stable resolution of the question of party spending, and the question of the
constitutionality of limits on party spending is likely to recur.
Moreover, that question has broad implications for the overall
structure of campaign finance regulation as well as for proposed
reforms.
Striking the limits on party spending may be like pulling on
a loose thread and causing a whole sleeve to unravel. Justice
Thomas's presumption that parties are incapable of corrupting
their candidates would appear to eliminate the basis for restrictions on party contributions to candidates. Justice Kennedy's
opinion sought to leave open the constitutionality of restrictions
on "undifferentiated political party contributions,"108 but his notion of the "practical identity" of party and candidate implicitly
invalidates restrictions on party contributions to candidates,
107.
100).

See, e.g., Epstein, PoliticalPartiesin the American Mold at 217-18 (cited in note

108. 116 S. Ct. at 2323.
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too-assuming parties would still want to make contributions if
they enjoyed the right of unlimited coordinated expenditure.
Thus, under either approach, invalidating the limit on coordinated spending is likely to result in the elimination on any limits
on party financial support for candidates.
Further, Justice Thomas's opinion suggests the basis for an
attack on the limits on contributions to parties. In cases dealing
with contributions to political committees, the Court has given
great weight to the corruptive potential of contributions by an
organization in order to justify restrictions on contributions to
the organization. Thus, Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
BerkeleylO9 invalidated an ordinance restricting contributions to
committees that support or oppose ballot measures, reasoning
that since spending by a ballot measure committee raises no possibility of corruption (since there was no candidate to corrupt)
there was no constitutional basis for limiting contributions to the
committee. But in CaliforniaMedical Ass'n v. FEC, and FEC v.
National Right to Work Committee the Court relied on the anticorruption rationale to uphold limits on contributions to PACs
that gave funds to candidates.11o
Given Justice Thomas's reliance on the statutory limits on
contributions to parties to rebut the argument that party expenditures raise the risk of conduit corruption, my argument that the
logic of Thomas's position would undermine the limits on donations to parties may be something of a speculative stretch. Nevertheless, if the Court were to buy the argument that there is
nothing corrupting in a party's influence over its candidates and
that party size and diversity mitigate the danger of conduit corruption, then the anti-corruption rationale for limiting contributions to parties would be discredited. Although the growth of soft
money has eroded the effect of FECA's limits on donations to
parties, acceptance of Justice Thomas's argument might make it
impossible to close the soft money loophole, and would also, of
course, have implications for state laws that impose limits on contributions to state parties in connection with state campaigns.
A right of unlimited party spending could also knock out the
spending limits in the presidential public funding system, and,
similarly, jeopardize state public funding laws for state elections
and proposals to use public funds to limit the use of private
funds. Buckley invalidated limits on campaign expenditures but
held that Congress could condition the grant of public funds on a
109. 454 U.S. 290, 297 (1981).
110. See Cal Med, 453 U.S. at 197-99, 201; NRWC, 459 U.S. at 207-10.
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candidate's acceptance of spending limits.I' The limit on publicly-funded candidate spending has also applied to spending by
the candidate's party. The rise of soft money has dramatically
expanded the amount of private funds available to publiclyfunded presidential candidates. Nevertheless, the statutory restrictions on party spending in support of presidential candidates
make presidential elections primarily publicly funded and assure
a measure of parity between the major party candidates.
Could those restrictions survive a holding that party expenditures are constitutionally protected? If, as Justice Kennedy contends, "candidates are necessary to make the party's message
known and effective" and limits on party spending "constrain[ ]
the party in advocating its most essential positions and pursuing
its most basic goals,"112 then how can party spending on behalf of
its leading speaker-its presidential candidate-be limited?l13
Under Buckley a presidential candidate can waive his or her own
right to unlimited spending in order to receive party funds, but
would a candidate's waiver bind party committees?
In NCPAC, the Court held that a candidate's acceptance of
spending limits as a condition for public funding did not bind independent committees, which remain entitled to spend unlimited
sums in support of that candidate. Notwithstanding Justice Kennedy's rhetoric about the "practical identity" of candidates and
parties, presidential candidates do not control their party committees-certainly not the state committees or the congressional
finance committees which might want to spend in support of the
presidential candidate in order to have an effect on the fortunes
of party candidates further down the ballot. If, as Justice Kennedy put it, parties "exist to advance their members' shared
political beliefs,"114 it may not be possible for one candidate to
waive the speech rights of the many people affiliated with the
party.
A right of unlimited party coordinated spending thus might
make it impossible to limit candidate spending even as a condition for the receipt of public funds. It is possible that only parties
could waive party spending rights. This might mean that any at111.

424 U.S. at 57 n.65. See also Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FederalElection Com.

mission, 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
112. 116 S. Ct. at 2322-23.

113. Indeed, even the plurality threatens public funding since party committees, such
as state party committees, that avoid direct contact with the presidential candidates could
be "independent-in-fact" and presumably could engage in unlimited spending on behalf
of the party's presidential candidate. Under the concurrences, party committees might be
able to work with their presidential candidate directly.
114.

Id. at 2322.

1997]

CAMPAIGN FINANCE

tempt to use the public funding system to enforce spending limits
might require offering public funding to the parties rather than
(or in addition to) the candidates. This would certainly serve to
promote greater party responsibility in government, and might
even be a good idea, but it would be a sharp departure from existing practice if public funding of parties were to become necessary to impose spending limits on candidates."5
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF COLORADO REPUBLICAN
FOR BUCKLEY v. VALEO
Colorado Republican was a hard case, as the multiple opinions suggest. The Court's difficulty may have been attributable in
part to the constitutionally ambiguous status of parties. In other
cases, the Court has treated parties both as quasi-state actors,
subject to constitutional requirements, and as the epitome of the
private political associations shielded by the First Amendment
from state regulation. Indeed, earlier this past term, the Court
fragmented along lines similar to those in Colorado Republican
when it considered whether the Voting Rights Act could be applied to a change in a state party's convention rules.116
Moreover, party spending poses a particularly hard issue for
the Buckley framework. Buckley's contribution/expenditure distinction and its concern with corruption implicitly assume a separation between candidates and their financial backers, and the
possibility that financial support will be a source of improper influence on candidates. But parties are composed of both candidates and contributors to their campaigns. Party committees
support candidates primarily to advance their shared interests
rather than to influence them. Parties thus straddle the candidate-contributor gap intrinsic to the Buckley model.
115. It is possible that in the existing presidential public funding system, the provision
of public funds for the national party conventions could provide the basis for the party
waiver of the right of unlimited coordinated spending. However, if the parties were able
to raise and spend unlimited amounts of money in the presidential election they might
choose to forgo public funds for the convention. Despite the public funding law, large
donors currently play a significant role in financing the party conventions. See Phil Kuntz
and Michael K. Frisby, For Big Contributors,Convention's Business Isn't at the Podium,
Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1996 at Al.
Nor, given the traditionally decentralized structure of the major parties, is it clear
that the party national committee's agreement to limit spending in exchange for convention funds would bind state party committees.
116. See Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996). As in Colorado Republican, the principal groupings on the Court were Justices Stevens and Ginsburg in an opinion by Justice Stevens; Justices Breyer, O'Connor and Souter in an opinion
by Justice Breyer, and Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
in multiple overlapping opinions.

124

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 14:91

Colorado Republican may also be indicative of deeper difficulties in the Court's approach to campaign finance regulation.
Buckley assumes a distinction between expressions of support for
political ideas and positions and efforts to influence candidatesthe former are treated as constitutionally protected from restriction while the latter are treated as problematic and subject to
regulation. Yet the distinction between support for ideas and efforts to influence candidates is often elusive. Money given to support a candidate who shares the donor's beliefs or issue-positions
may influence the candidate to continue to adhere to that position, while money given to influence a candidate usually goes to
candidates who have signaled at least some openness to supporting the donor's position.
Moreover, Buckley is focused entirely on the question of the
influence of campaign money on candidates and officeholders;
the Court firmly ruled out consideration of the influence of campaign money or of disparities in resources available for political
activity on the conduct or outcomes of elections as a factor in
constitutional analysis. Concerns about the influence of money,
and especially of unequal sums of money, on election outcomes
has been a prime factor driving campaign finance regulation.
Even the Court, Buckley notwithstanding, has not been entirely
immune to these concerns, as Austin's focus on corporate campaign war chests demonstrates-although Austin wrapped its
concern over unequal spending in the open-ended language of
corruption.
Dissatisfaction with Buckley led one Colorado Republican
Justice explicitly and two others implicitly to break away from
the Buckley framework. Justice Thomas, in the portion of his
opinion not joined by any other Justice, rejected the contribution/expenditure distinction, and urged that restrictions on contributions, as well as limitations on expenditures, be subject to
strict scrutiny. In his view, bribery laws and disclosure requirements are adequate to prevent corruption.117 Conversely, one of
the reasons Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, gave for
sustaining the FECA limits is the government's "important interest in leveling the electoral playing field by constraining the cost
of federal campaigns."118 This is flatly inconsistent with Buckley's
rejection of any government interest in limiting the cost of cam-

117.
118.

116 S. Ct. at 2325-29.
Id. at 2332.
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paigns as a justification for limiting campaign finances.119 Moreover, the dissent's citation to Justice White's Buckley dissent, its
skepticism that increased campaign spending necessarily promotes the "informed debate protected by the First Amendment,"
and its willingness to "accord special deference" to Congress's
"wisdom and experience" concerning campaign finance suggest
that Justices Stevens and Ginsburg may have rejected the Buckley doctrine generally.
Colorado Republican's difficulties in applying the Buckley
framework and the rejection of the Buckley approach by three
members of the Court indicate the troubled state of the current
doctrinal approach to campaign finance regulation. Nonetheless,
it may be a little premature to toll Buckley's death knell. Chief
Justice Burger and Justice White dissented from basic elements
of Buckley twenty years ago and Justice Marshall subsequently
came to reject the contribution/expenditure distinction120 so the
doctrine has survived the opposition of three sitting Justices
before.
Moreover, given the different directions in which the
Thomas and Stevens opinions pull, the Court seems far from a
consensus on a model that would replace Buckley. Austin hinted
at a greater acceptance of egalitarian arguments for campaign
limits, but with the replacement of Austin's author, Justice Marshall, by Justice Thomas, Austin itself may be hanging by a thread
and may be more of a special "corporations" case now than ever
before.121 At the same time, no other member of the Colorado
Republican Court endorsed Justice Thomas's extreme hostility to
campaign finance regulation. The plurality's fact-specific decision
may indicate a concern by those three Justices to minimize judicial disruption of Congress' campaign finance handiwork. Judicially mandated deregulation of campaign finance seems even
119.

Indeed, one of the reasons the plurality rejected the danger of corruption as a

basis for restricting party independent spending is its determination that Congress
adopted the FECA ceiling not to control corruption "but rather for the constitutionally

insufficient purpose of reducing what it saw as wasteful and excessive campaign spending." Id. at 2317.
120. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 518.
121. Austin was decided by a vote of 6-3. The six Justices in the majority were Justice

Marshall, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Brennan, white, Blackmun and Stevens.
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Scalia dissented. The replacement of Justice Marshall by

Justice Thomas reduces support for Austin's broad reading of corruption from six to five.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has consistently supported the Buckley framework, but has
equally consistently made a special exception to permit restrictions on corporations.
There is no evidence that any of the Austin dissenters have become more receptive to
arguments that governments may justify spending restrictions to limit the impact of campaign war chests on the electorate.
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less probable than judicial endorsement of egalitarian
restrictions.
For all its problems, then, Buckley continues to shape judicial consideration of campaign finance regulation. Buckley's internal tensions will make the doctrine difficult to apply and the
evolution of case law difficult to predict. Campaign finance cases
are likely to remain an arena of conflict within the Court, much
as Buckley's limited focus on quid pro quo corruption will continue to be a source of conflict between the Court and campaign
finance reformers.

